public:rem4:rem4-18:philosophy_of_science_ii
Table of Contents
Philosophy of Science II
Concepts
| Induction (ísl. aðleiðsla) | A generalization from a set of observations. Generalization can be about a class of observed phenomena or about a particular unobserved phenomenon that is part of the class. Considered a key to the advancement of scientific knowledge. |
| Scientific theory (ísl. vísindakenning) | “A set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or is widely accepted and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena.” |
| Prediction, predictive powers (ísl. forspá, forsagnargildi) | A good theory can explain and predict. (More on this below.) |
| The value and power of a scientific theory | Measured by (a) its ability to explain, (b) its ability to to be withstand attempts to falsify it and © its ability to predict. |
| Scientific theories in the natural sciences | Build on comparative experiments as primary method of investigation. Comparative experiments are attempts to falsification; they test the predicitive power of theories. Results are used to tune the theory. |
| Prediction and falsification: opposite ends of the same dimension | A theory's strength can be measured at least in two ways, (a) by its power to predict and (b) by its ability to withstand attempts to falsification. |
| The role of “storytelling” | The ability of individuals and groups to create coherent verifiable stories (explanations) of how phenomena in the world are connected, and produce rigorous models that support the stories, is a necessary condition for scientific progress. |
Induction is not Enough: Refutability of Scientific Theories
| Karl Popper | “Induction” as a process for producing scientific theories, does not exist in the form proposed. |
| Popperian extremism | While we can say that Popper was an extremist when it comes to his discussion of theories, we can agree with him that the role of science is to come up with theories that are falsifiable. |
| Popper's favorite examples of pseudotheories | Sigmund Freud's and Karl Marx's |
| Karl Marx's economic theory | The rich will be richer and the poor poorer ( - the path of the West?) |
| Popper's idealism | We cannot simply take the last 100 or 200 years of natural science as the ideal of science and assume that anything that doesn't look like it is psudo-science. That would be ignoring at least 2000 years of what Popper would call psudo-science: Philosophical beginnings of all scientific fields. |
| Scientific methods (and fields) evolve from early philosophical considerations | All sciences have begun as speculations. Math was developed to help with managing complexities in the natural sciences; we need other, more powerful tools for some of the remaining problems. |
| Darwin's theory of evolution | According to a large proportion of modern scientists in all fields, Darwin is the greatest scientist of the last milennium. Because his theory is not falsifiable it would rank high on Popper's list of bad scientific theories. |
| Freud | An important thing to keep in mind is not to let egos and personal admiration get in the way of critical thought. Perhaps it may be justified that Freudian methods are still being used in clinical treatment of mental patients, but perhaps not: We should let the numbers, as produced by comparative experiments and comparative studies, tell us whether these methods are worth holding on to. (If such comparative studies are too expensive to do properly, perhaps we should value mental sanity more!) |
| Freud and Marx: twilight zone | These teachings sit somewhere between philosophy and a mature science. (Freud was one of the first major names to put forth the idea that the mind has parts.) As with all philosophy and science one must look at what they said when they said it and put aside idealism and personal admiration. |
| Simulation | Only recently have we developed a tool that are powerful enough to study many of the phenomena that we experience every day, such as the mechanisms of commerce, the forces of the cosmos, the mysteries of thought. That tool is computer simulation. |
The Importance of Creative Thought in the Progress of Science
| Creativity in Science | No good theory exists without the creative activity of a human! Creativity is one of the main driving forces of science, because without new ideas, little or no progress could be made. |
| The role of induction | In an effort to make the creative process more “objective” or “rule-like”, philosophers and scientist have often argued that the main ingredient is “logical induction”, generalization that flows “logically” from a number of observations. This view ignores the creative component of scientific work and may be responsible for why science education is in many cases taught in a boring fashion. |
| Pure “Popperism” | Pure Popperism suppresses the “storytelling” part of scientific enterprise By shifting empahsis onto the falsification as the most important part of science the creative element is suppressed |
| The result? | We end up with a much lower number of creative people* in science than otherwise. It is possible that this slows down the progress of science. |
*NB: This does not refer to the common phrase “creative people” as in those who play instruments, create clay sculptures or work at advertisement agencies. This refers to the common notion of the concept of creativity.
The Role of Science: To Explain the Universe
| Scientific Theories | Deepen our understanding of the universe. |
| A Scientific Theory | 1. Predicts. 2. Supports goal-achievement. 3. Explains. 4. Models (re-create). Any one of these can be partial. |
| Phenomenon | A phenomenon is any set of (partially or fully) observable/measurable variables in the world. An event, a thing, a system. |
| Full Understanding | Full/complete understanding of a phenomenon means we can predict any and all aspects of the phenomenon, we can achieve goals with respect to any and all attributes of the phenomenon, we can explain any and all aspects of the phenomenon, and we can model any and all aspects of the phenomenon – our model is complete. |
| Complete Models | Allow us to create software simulations that approach a correct and complete representation of the phenomenon. |
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